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REPLY BRIEF
COMES NOW the Appellant and pursuant to Rule 24(c) of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, submits the following Reply
Brief,

This Reply Brief is limited to responding only to new

matters set out in the Brief of the Appellee, Stanley L. Wade.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The lower Court twice entered Default Judgments against
the Defendant Stanley Wade.

A Default Judgment entered by prior

Judge Dean Condor was reversed by the new Judge, Richard Moffat.
Judge Moffat then entered a second Default Judgment only to set
it aside.

Judge Moffat then entered a Summary Judgment against

the Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant Stanley Wade owned the skateboard park
which is the subject of this claim.

He leased it as a skateboard

park to a tenant for the purposes of operating it as a skateboard
park.
The premises as they were leased were defective in that
a drain cover was apparently omitted from the premises.
The Plaintiff's injuries occurred within one month of
the date the Defendant leased the premises.
Since this is a review of a Summary Judgment, the
Plaintiff is entitled to have all inferences drawn in favor of
the Plaintiff.

1

ARGUMENT
The lower Court does not have unlimited authority to
set aside its own Judgment.
The lower Court entertained an untimely Motion to Set
Aside a Judgment.

There is no procedural rule which authorizes

vacating a Judgment outside of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 59 and Rule 60(b).

The cases cited by the Appellee do not

stand for the proposition that timely requests are not required
under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rather, they cite to the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and require compliance therewith.
Nothing in the cited cases supports the proposition that a lower
Court

can,

without

any

regard

to

a

timely

filing

of

an

appropriate Motion, merely set aside its Judgments.
POINT TWO
The Court appropriately struck the pleadings of the
Defendant for its failure to cooperate in the discovery process.
It was an abuse of discretion and beyond the authority of the
lower Court to entertain an untimely Motion and to give the
Defendant a "third bite at the apple".
POINT THREE
There are material issues of fact which, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, entitle

Plaintiff to

his day in Court.
Assuming that the Court does not summarily re-enter
Judgment against the Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled to have
his day in Court.

On Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff is entitled
2

to have the facts viewed

in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff.
Both parties are in agreement as to the legal standard
by which the actions of the landlord are to be measured.

The

standard is quoted in Defendants' Brief, page 7 where Defendants
cite Stephenson vs. Warner and Greenwood, 581 P. 2d 567 (Utah
1978) . The standard holds the landlord to exercise ordinary care
and prudence.

The landlord may be held

liable for injuries

caused by any defects or serious conditions which he created, or
of which he was aware.

It is a question of fact as to whether or

not the landlord created the unreasonable condition or whether he
knew of its existence one month previous to the injury when he
leased

the premises.

In the present case the Plaintiff is

entitled to have the facts construed in the light most favorable
to him.

The facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff, would support the inference that the missing drain
cover was missing at the time that the property was leased by the
landlord one month previous to the injuries.
The Plaintiff
facts and

is entitled to have a jury weigh the

decide whether

or not the Defendant here has any

responsibility for the injuries.

It is a question of fact.

A

jury could reasonably conclude that leasing the premises without
a drain cover was negligent.

The question of whether or not the

movement of the drain cover from one area to another is a matter
for the defense to urge and for the jury to weigh.
of a drain cover in and of itself was negligent.
3

The absence
The landlord

should not have leased the premises without securing drain covers
for all of the drains on the leased premises.
The Defendants1 argument that the condition came into
existence after the lease is specious.

The drain cover was

missing

were

at

landlord.

the

time

that

the

premises

leased

by

the

The fact that the drain cover was moved from one place

to another is reasonable and foreseeable.

It is the absence of

the drain cover which caused the movement of drain covers from
one area to another.

Had the landlord insured that all drains

were properly covered at the outset, there would have been no
need for the drain cover to be moved from one place to another.
It was the landlord's negligence in failing to provide sufficient
drain covers which created the hazard, and not the tenant's
movement of a drain cover from one area to another.
CONCLUSION
The proceedings below were irregular, and the Court
lacked authority to untimely

set aside its Default Judgment.

Since there was no timely motion filed by the Defendant below,
and

since

the

Rules do not contemplate

any procedure which

authorizes the lower Court to sit in appeal of itself, the lower
Court erred in setting aside the Default Judgment.

This Court

should reenter the Default Judgment, and it should be a final,
unappealable decision.
The lower Court also erred in granting Summary Judgment
against Plaintiff.

From the facts viewed in the light most

4

favorable to Plaintiff, Summary Judgment should not issue.
DATED this

^--

day_of April, 1990,
//

'

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
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